NPR

Rhubarb & Custard wrote: Thu Jun 12, 2025 7:24 am

Hellraiser wrote: Wed Jun 11, 2025 11:16 pm The MBT/IFV issue is one of force preservation. They've reached the bottom of the barrel for the old Soviet era stockpiles. Putin may very well be in the dark about the true picture, but the brass in the army isn't.

This narrative has been in play for a long time now. And then the Russians launch more men and/or missiles at Ukraine with abandon

Rhubarb & Custard wrote: Thu Jun 12, 2025 7:24 am

Hellraiser wrote: Wed Jun 11, 2025 11:16 pm The MBT/IFV issue is one of force preservation. They've reached the bottom of the barrel for the old Soviet era stockpiles. Putin may very well be in the dark about the true picture, but the brass in the army isn't.

This narrative has been in play for a long time now. And then the Russians launch more men and/or missiles at Ukraine with abandon

Flockwitt wrote: Mon Jun 09, 2025 6:40 pm OPEC have decided to raise production output, looks like Russian cruide will remain below $50/barrel for the rest of this year.

Uncle fester wrote: Fri Jun 13, 2025 6:37 am

Flockwitt wrote: Mon Jun 09, 2025 6:40 pm OPEC have decided to raise production output, looks like Russian cruide will remain below $50/barrel for the rest of this year.

The fun and games in the gulf might push that back up again.

geordie_6 wrote: Fri Jun 13, 2025 6:01 am

Rhubarb & Custard wrote: Thu Jun 12, 2025 7:24 am

Hellraiser wrote: Wed Jun 11, 2025 11:16 pm The MBT/IFV issue is one of force preservation. They've reached the bottom of the barrel for the old Soviet era stockpiles. Putin may very well be in the dark about the true picture, but the brass in the army isn't.

This narrative has been in play for a long time now. And then the Russians launch more men and/or missiles at Ukraine with abandon

Isn't that the point though? They're launching more missiles and men, in golf buggies and motorcycles, because they're running low on tanks and IFVs? Id draw a distinction between running low and running out, but after three years of constant warfare it's not entirely surprising that their stockpiles would be running down?

Rhubarb & Custard wrote: Fri Jun 13, 2025 8:08 am

geordie_6 wrote: Fri Jun 13, 2025 6:01 am

Rhubarb & Custard wrote: Thu Jun 12, 2025 7:24 am

This narrative has been in play for a long time now. And then the Russians launch more men and/or missiles at Ukraine with abandon

Isn't that the point though? They're launching more missiles and men, in golf buggies and motorcycles, because they're running low on tanks and IFVs? Id draw a distinction between running low and running out, but after three years of constant warfare it's not entirely surprising that their stockpiles would be running down?

It just feels like a repeat good news claim that in practical terms then never plays out. Russia just cotinues to advance, albeit slowly (and I'd say at great cost but they don't seem to care about that), and we continue to ignore Ukraine's need for help.

Rhubarb & Custard wrote: Fri Jun 13, 2025 8:08 am

geordie_6 wrote: Fri Jun 13, 2025 6:01 am

Rhubarb & Custard wrote: Thu Jun 12, 2025 7:24 am

This narrative has been in play for a long time now. And then the Russians launch more men and/or missiles at Ukraine with abandon

Isn't that the point though? They're launching more missiles and men, in golf buggies and motorcycles, because they're running low on tanks and IFVs? Id draw a distinction between running low and running out, but after three years of constant warfare it's not entirely surprising that their stockpiles would be running down?

It just feels like a repeat good news claim that in practical terms then never plays out. Russia just cotinues to advance, albeit slowly (and I'd say at great cost but they don't seem to care about that), and we continue to ignore Ukraine's need for help.

Flockwitt wrote: Fri Jun 13, 2025 10:14 am There is plenty of click bait out there. But the actual numbers don't lie and you'll see the comment previously here that Russia isn't expected to get into real trouble with it's gear until 2026 and only if they keep throwing stuff into assaults rather than digging in. But that doesn't mean we're not seeing the affects now on the battlefield. Forget the hype - the bottom line is that Russia can't win the war. There is nothing more they can do bar grind forward at huge cost for no actual strategic gain. The human cost is high, the materiel cost is high, Russia's debt is soaring, their cost of repaying that debt is soaring, their 2025 bond offering was hugely expensive.

When will push come to shove? Hard to say. I'd guess one more year personally. However, it's only a question of what will give first with Russia if Ukraine can be supported through this.

tabascoboy wrote: Fri Jun 13, 2025 10:48 am Nah, everything is fine

PornDog wrote: Fri Jun 13, 2025 4:32 pm Pilot was saved eh?

fishfoodie wrote: Fri Jun 13, 2025 6:52 pm There was an article a few months ago trying to work out how many combat capable pilots the Orcs had, I think triggered by some senior Officer in his 50s flying combat missions; the conclusion was that like every other part of their military, the Air Force continually lied to the Kremlin, & exaggerated their combat readiness, as they didn't have the resources to train enough pilots, or give them the flight hours to get them to any reasonable standard, & all the older ones preferred to go into the Private sector & earn real money.

Uncle fester wrote: Tue Jun 17, 2025 6:46 am Trump wants Russia readmitted to the G7.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/ ... -in-canada

OSINT researcher Chris O'Wicky has tracked down available materials on the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Russian Armed Forces.

According to obituaries and missing persons reports from relatives, the brigade's losses amounted to 12,689 people - 7,436 killed and 5,253 missing.

Before the full-scale war, the brigade’s staff strength was about 2,000 people, meaning that its composition had already been renewed many times.

The brigade suffered particularly heavy losses in three operations:

• In October 2023, the brigade took part in the battles for Avdiivka and Novobakhmutovka, where it suffered 2,128 casualties.

• In October 2024, during the battle for Mikhailovka, the brigade lost at least 152 people killed in just one day.

• At the end of 2024 and the beginning of 2025, the brigade took part in the battles for Novotroitskoye, where it lost 6,791 people killed and 1,245 wounded.

Chris O'Wicky provides some testimonies from Russian soldiers who managed to survive, as well as relatives of the military.

From these testimonies it follows that the brigade practices torture, execution of deserters, sending into battle immediately after arriving at the unit, looting, as well as extortion of bribes - for example, for leave or for the opportunity not to be sent into an assault.

The researcher notes that, according to data from the publication Verstka, the 15th Brigade leads all other units of the Russian Armed Forces in the number of negative mentions on Russian social networks.

@yigal_levin

Uncle fester wrote: Tue Jun 17, 2025 6:46 am Trump wants Russia readmitted to the G7.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/ ... -in-canada

Orbán targets Ukraine’s EU bid with shocking AI video featuring Hungarian coffins and soldiers
“We do not want our children to be sent to the Ukrainian front and see them come home from there in a coffin,” Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said in a video posted on Facebook on Monday.

Orbán published a video with a fake statement The video starts with a statement by former chief of staff Romulusz Ruszin-Szendi, of the opposition Tisza Party, saying that “if Ukraine were a member of the EU or NATO… it would be right for our forces to go there”. Ruszin-Szendi spoke about this in an interview six months ago, but the sentence has been taken out of context and, moreover, the train of thought has been clearly cut off. The rest of the sentence, “the forces of the North Atlantic countries, without that, could be a casus belli for Russia,” has been omitted.

Ruszin-Szendi has since stated several times that it is a lie that he said anyone would send Hungarian soldiers to Ukraine. “We do not want our children to be sent to the Ukrainian fronts or even to Ukrainian territory in the form of Hungarian troops and see them come home in a coffin,” Orbán says in the video. The video also calls on people to “click now and vote no on the voks2025.hu website”.

Continue reading at https://dailynewshungary.com/orban-targ ... -soldiers/ | DailyNewsHungary

Uncle fester wrote: Tue Jun 17, 2025 6:46 am Trump wants Russia readmitted to the G7.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/ ... -in-canada

Spotify’s Daniel Ek leads €600mn investment in German drone maker Helsing

Defence start-up valued at €12bn to become one of Europe’s most valuable tech groups

Tim Bradshaw and Ivan Levingston in London

Published
JUN 17 2025

Spotify founder Daniel Ek’s investment company is leading a €600mn funding round in Helsing, valuing the German defence tech group at €12bn and making it one of Europe’s most valuable start-ups.

The deal comes as the Munich-based start-up is expanding from its origins in artificial intelligence software to produce its own drones, aircraft and submarines.

Helsing is benefiting from a surge of investment in defence groups, as a highly charged geopolitical environment spurs nations all over the world to increase military spending and the war in Ukraine triggers a rethink of battlefield technology.

Prima Materia, the investment company founded by Ek and early Spotify investor Shakil Khan in 2020, made the first significant investment into Helsing in 2021, months before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Now Prima Materia is “doubling down”, Ek told the Financial Times. It is leading the start-up’s latest investment alongside existing backers including Swedish defence group Saab and venture capitalists Lightspeed Ventures, Accel, Plural and General Catalyst.

The deal brings its total capital raised to €1.37bn.

“The world is being tested in more ways than ever before. That has sped up the timeline” for Helsing’s financing, Ek said, pointing in particular to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, where drones and other AI-powered systems have been deployed at scale for the first time.

“There’s an enormous realisation that it’s really now AI, mass and autonomy that is driving the new battlefield,” Ek said. “We can’t understate the implications of that for this conflict [in Ukraine] or really any conflict going forward.”

Four-year-old Helsing’s valuation has more than doubled since it raised €450mn less than a year ago. The latest investment, which is made through a combination of traditional equity and other financing, values the company at about €12bn, said people familiar with the matter.

The figure ranks Helsing among the five most valuable private tech companies in Europe. The company declined to comment on its valuation.

The deal comes after California-based start-up Anduril recently raised $2.5bn at a $30.5bn valuation. European drone makers Quantum Systems and Tekever were both valued at more than €1bn last month.

Helsing has sold thousands of strike drones, produced in its facility in southern Germany, to Ukraine. It has also secured contracts the UK, Germany and Sweden.

The company recently completed successful test flights of its autonomous air combat system, which piloted a Saab fighter jet, and unveiled plans for a fleet of unmanned surveillance submarines.

Ek, who also chairs Helsing, said: “We’re now at an inflection point . . . where we are going from a software company to an all-domain, AI software and hardware company.”

Helsing was founded in 2021 by Torsten Reil, a video games entrepreneur, Gundbert Scherf, a former German defence ministry official, and Niklas Köhler, an AI researcher. The trio has vowed not to sell the company and instead plans to go public in the future.

Helsing has struck partnerships with Saab to incorporate its AI software into the Swedish defence group’s systems, as well as with Paris-based Mistral to build out its platform’s decision-making capabilities. However, a partnership with German military giant Rheinmetall, announced in 2022, fizzled last year.

Ek’s initial investment into Helsing triggered a backlash against Spotify, the digital music service he co-founded in 2006 and still runs as chief executive. But he said he was not worried about the potential threat of another boycott.

“I’m sure people will criticise it and that’s OK,” Ek said. “Personally, I’m not concerned about it. I focus more on doing what I think is right and I am 100 per cent convinced that this is the right thing for Europe.”

Breaking News: Europe plans to triple Eurofighter Typhoon jet production to answer demand from allies and partners.

18 Jun, 2025 - 12:39
Defense News Aerospace 2025

At the 2025 Paris Air Show, Jorge Degenhardt, CEO of the Eurofighter Typhoon consortium, confirmed that the annual production rate of the Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jet will be raised from the current 12 units to 20 aircraft per year, with the potential to reach 30 units depending on the evolution of future sales. According to Gareth Jennings, Degenhardt cited “the total madness” of the current geopolitical situation as the reason for this planned increase.

The decision was made in anticipation of both confirmed new orders and projected foreign sales, with the objective of aligning production capacity with growing demand. The CEO’s statement reflects a coordinated strategy to adjust output levels in response to both partner nation requirements and international interest, and confirms a change of tempo from previous years when production had declined.

Historically, Eurofighter production peaked around 2010 during the execution of Tranche 2 deliveries, with output levels reaching approximately 60 aircraft annually. Following the completion of initial orders from the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Spain, the production rate progressively declined, reaching around 14 aircraft per year by 2023–2024. The decline corresponded to the delivery completion of Tranche 3 contracts and a relative lull in new procurement activity. However, a recent series of contracts from core consortium nations has driven a partial recovery in output, pushing the rate back up to around 20 aircraft per year. The production lines, operated by Airbus, BAE Systems, and Leonardo, have resumed a pace aligned with newly signed agreements, and the stated goal is to raise this further to 30 units annually if market conditions permit.

Germany placed an order in November 2020 for 38 Tranche 4 Typhoons under the Quadriga program, valued at €5.4 billion. In June 2024, Germany confirmed a further order for 20 units, securing its production needs through 2032. Spain signed contracts for 45 additional Typhoons across the Halcón I (June 2022) and Halcón II (September 2023) phases, scheduled for delivery between 2026 and 2035 and amounting to approximately €6.5 billion in total. Italy joined with a December 2024 order for 24 aircraft, in conjunction with Spain. Although the United Kingdom has not issued new domestic procurement contracts since 2009, it remains involved in Eurofighter-related export projects and final deliveries. These three recent national orders alone account for 127 new aircraft, enabling a sustained production baseline at 20 aircraft per year through at least the early 2030s. Meanwhile, Qatar remains a customer with ongoing deliveries and is reportedly considering an additional 12 units, though this follow-on has not yet been finalized.

On the export front, Eurofighter GmbH estimates a potential for 150 to 200 additional sales between 2023 and 2025. A report by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), published in April 2024, outlines a scenario with up to 287 new sales, comprising 74 to existing partners and 213 to foreign customers. Export prospects include Saudi Arabia, which is exploring the acquisition of up to 60 further aircraft, as well as new bids submitted to Austria, Poland, Greece, and Portugal. In 2024, Turkey expressed formal interest in acquiring 40 Typhoons, and preliminary authorization was granted. However, the German government exercised its veto power in April 2025, halting the proposed sale due to political concerns related to Ankara’s domestic developments and bilateral tensions. This veto has suspended the Turkish case, and future decisions will depend on changes in German policy or international diplomatic conditions.

In parallel to production increases, the consortium and its partner governments are supporting industrial and technological continuity ahead of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), the sixth-generation fighter project led by the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan. To maintain the necessary skills and infrastructure during this transition, the UK has committed £204.6 million for the development and serial production of the ECRS Mk2 radar, with integration into Typhoon platforms expected to begin in 2028. This investment is designed to ensure continued industrial activity until GCAP becomes operational in 2035. The radar upgrade project is intended to enhance the Typhoon’s electronic warfare capabilities while also securing supplier engagement in radar and avionics systems relevant to both Eurofighter and future platforms. The program serves as a bridging mechanism, avoiding production gaps and workforce attrition in critical aerospace domains.

The Eurofighter consortium operates multiple final assembly lines across four partner nations: Warton in the United Kingdom, Manching in Germany, Turin in Italy, and Getafe in Spain. To accommodate the projected output increase from 20 to 30 aircraft annually, these lines will require synchronized capacity adjustments across component and subsystem supply chains. The industrial plan includes coordination with EuroJet Turbo GmbH for EJ200 engine deliveries and with companies such as Leonardo and Hensoldt for radar production. The modular structure of the program allows each nation to produce the same components for all aircraft regardless of final assembly location, which supports scalable output levels. Logistical adjustments are ongoing to prepare for the potential expansion, with emphasis placed on maintaining schedule integrity and delivery timelines for confirmed and future contracts.

The current production trajectory confirms that the Eurofighter Typhoon remains a key component of European defense aviation planning into the 2030s. The confirmed increase from 12 to 20 aircraft per year reflects stable demand across the consortium’s domestic customer base, while the possible increase to 30 aircraft annually is dependent on the successful conclusion of pending foreign contracts. Political factors such as export licensing and intergovernmental approvals continue to influence sales outcomes, particularly in cases such as Turkey. Meanwhile, procurement by Germany, Spain, and Italy has ensured a stable production outlook for the near future. The expansion supports both operational force modernization and the maintenance of aerospace manufacturing capability until the GCAP platform enters full-rate production in the following decade.

The Eurofighter Typhoon is a twin-engine, canard delta wing multirole combat aircraft capable of performing air-to-air and air-to-ground missions with a focus on agility, sensor integration, and multirole adaptability. In its current configuration, it is equipped with the mechanically scanned Captor-M radar, the PIRATE infrared search and track system for passive detection, and the Praetorian defensive aids subsystem that includes radar warning receivers, missile approach warning systems, towed decoys, and electronic countermeasures. It can carry and employ a wide range of munitions, including beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles such as Meteor and AMRAAM, infrared-guided short-range missiles like IRIS-T and ASRAAM, as well as precision air-to-ground weapons such as Brimstone, Paveway series laser-guided bombs, and the Storm Shadow cruise missile. The aircraft supports networked operations through the MIDS Link 16 datalink and can conduct simultaneous swing-role missions. Current upgrades in operational service include the Phase 1 Enhancement Package (P1Eb) and Project Centurion modifications, which integrate full strike capabilities and advanced targeting systems. The Typhoon also features advanced human-machine interfaces, including a wide-angle HUD, voice control, and a helmet-mounted symbology system, enabling high situational awareness in complex combat environments.

The remarkable resurgence the Russian economy has experienced since Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is losing momentum. Where once Putin could boast about 4.3 per cent growth rates for two years in a row – thumbing his nose at Western sanctions with all the aplomb of a man who’d discovered alchemy – the numbers now tell a somewhat different story. The party, as they say, is over – and the time to crank up sanctions against Moscow has come.

For two years running, Putin’s propagandists have crowed about Russia’s economic vitality as proof that Western sanctions were about as effective as a chocolate teapot. The economy’s steroid-fuelled growth, pumped up by hefty fiscal spending, facilitated the steepest rise in household incomes for nearly two decades. It pushed production and labour capabilities to the limit and propelled inflation into double digits, which the Central Bank tried to tame with a historically high record base rate.

Now, though, the overheating Russian economy is finally starting to cool down. In the first quarter of this year, GDP growth crawled to a relatively anaemic 1.4 per cent year on year – the weakest performance in more than two years. Compared to the previous quarter, business activity between January and March contracted by 1.2 per cent, and all indicators suggest further decline lies ahead.

Even the manufacturing sector, which had been recording double-digit growth with the enthusiasm of a Soviet five-year plan, has slumped to a mere 3 per cent growth in April – its lowest ebb since March 2023 – and to 2 per cent growth year-on-year in May. This is particularly telling, since manufacturing encompasses everything from the tanks to the boots which Putin’s war machine devours.

The buyer – the Russian state – hasn’t stopped spending. Indeed, government expenditure remains higher than pre-invasion levels, with roughly half of the additional spending in the first quarter channelled toward military purposes. Yet warning signs in the budget are beginning to flash.

May’s fiscal deficit increased by 200 billion roubles (£1.9 billion) since the start of the year, reaching 3.4 trillion roubles (£32.2 billion) – some 1.5 per cent of GDP. Amid declining global oil prices, hydrocarbon revenues – a perennial Russian crutch – have tumbled 14.4 per cent in the first five months of the year, with May alone witnessing a precipitous 35 per cent decline.

The government can finance the shortage in oil revenues through its rainy day fund, the so-called National Welfare Fund. This fund, designed to mitigate any decline in oil revenue, contains the cash equivalent to 1.3 per cent of GDP. This amount is set to increase by a further third in the coming months due to additional revenue from last year which has yet to be transferred.

This buffer may last a year, slightly longer, depending on oil prices and the Kremlin’s continued appetite for spending. However, the danger to the fiscal balance is not limited to oil prices. With economic activity slowing, the budget will receive less tax revenue from sales and corporate profits. The government’s initial budget deficit target for 2025, set at 0.5 per cent, has been revised to 1.7 per cent, still relatively low compared to that of, say, the UK. As such, to finance the deficit, the government can borrow domestically, albeit at a high interest rate.

One thing the Kremlin certainly won’t do is introduce austerity. Instead of prudent belt-tightening, something far more ominous will follow: the inexorable militarisation of the Russian economy. Even if the war in Ukraine were to end tomorrow – a prospect about as likely as Putin taking up flower arranging – Russia’s militarisation would continue apace. The army would need to replenish its depleted arsenal, and Moscow’s economic planners have also convinced themselves that weapons manufacturing represents the golden path to prosperity.

With demand for military goods remaining robust while overall output contracts, the arithmetic is brutally simple: the defence industry’s share of the economy will grow by default. Combined with Putin’s apocalyptic worldview and his circle’s conviction that Russia faces an existential threat, this suggests a rather grim future for anything resembling a normal economy. It’s a pattern hauntingly reminiscent of the 1980s, when the Soviet Union’s economic decline coincided with an inability to reduce military spending. We all know how that particular experiment ended.

This is where the effect of sanctions may become more visible. A tightening of restrictions on Russian oil and other exports would increase the cost of Russian oil sales, enabling its buyers, notably China, to negotiate a wider discount. A faster depletion of the National Welfare Fund, which is also used to smooth the volatility of the rouble, would make exchange rate swings even less predictable.

A more rigorous sanctions regime against technological imports and the banking system would increase prices, reduce productivity and dent corporate profits, thus putting more pressure on the budget and inflation. Smart moves to encourage capital outflow and brain drain would damage the labour market and investments, also pushing inflation up.

Just as in the Soviet era, it is during such times of hardship that outside economic pressure would have a more visible effect. The Russian economy is exhausting its two-year-long fever dream, built on public spending and a mortgaged future. Those with the power to engineer further sanctions against Moscow should sharpen their economic weapons and strike Putin’s economy while it’s weak.

Written by
Alexander Kolyandr

Alexander Kolyandr is a researcher for the Centre for European Policy Analysis specialising in the Russian economy and politics. Previously he was a journalist for the Wall Street Journal and a banker for Credit Suisse. He was born in Kharkiv, Ukraine and lives in London.

A phone call intercepted by Ukrainian intelligence reveals a heinous act of cannibalism among Russian troops, with one soldier accused of murdering and devouring a fellow serviceman while deployed in eastern Ukraine.

In a recording published on Friday by Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, HUR, on its Telegram channel, a Russian commander is heard telling a subordinate that a soldier identified by the call sign “Brelok” devoured his brother-in-arms “Foma” over the course of two weeks.

“Brelok took him out and then ate him for two f***ing weeks,” the voice says in the audio, which GUR attributes to a reconnaissance unit commander from Russia’s 68th Motorized Rifle Division.

Later, “Brelok” himself was found dead, the recording claims.

“They say he was a 200 [Russian military slang for a killed soldier], f**k. Well, he ate his comrade, so that’s something to think about,” the Russian soldier remarks grimly in the recording.

The beginning of the great massacre of Russian drone operators?

Russian propaganda channels began to complain en masse about the hunt for UAV operators of the Russian Armed Forces, which intensified significantly almost immediately after the appointment of "Magyar" as the commander of the SBS.

At the same time, according to the Russians, the Ukrainians do not spare any resources to carry out these tasks - they use, among other things, HIMARS to target enemy drones.

In addition, the Russians note that a significant portion of Ukrainian UAV operators have joined the hunt for enemy "colleagues" - even at the expense of destroying logistics and other targets.

@yigal_levin

GLOBSEC, a leading European think tank, has released its latest security scenarios report analyzing potential developments in the Russian war in Ukraine through 2025-2026, finding that a war of attrition with lowered intensity due to resource depletion represents the most probable outcome.
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The GLOBSEC analysis presents seven scenarios with varying probabilities – but crucially, none deliver sustainable peace:

1. Hybrid World War III (20% probability) – Western nuclear self-deterrence emboldens global aggressors

• Current intensity maintained (13% probability) – US and Europe provide optimal support

• Russian breakthroughs amid US withdrawal (4% probability) – Russia gains amid reduced Western aid

• War of attrition with lowered intensity (38% probability) – Resource depletion forces reduction

• Ceasefire on unacceptable terms for Ukraine (11% probability) – Ukraine forced into bad deal

• Reasonably acceptable ceasefire (12% probability) – Patchy peace process with no sustainable outcome

• “Peace” addressing Ukraine’s interests (2% probability) – The most dangerous illusion.

The path forward: critical actions required

The analysis reveals that achieving favorable outcomes requires immediate, concrete actions rather than diplomatic gestures alone. With military factors now driving the situation at a 9:1 ratio over political considerations, Western allies face a narrow window for decisive intervention.

Critical military support requirements:

• Ensure production of 10-12 air defense complexes monthly for Ukraine

• Scale artillery shell production to 40-50 thousand units per month by 2026

• Support development of 120-150 long-range ballistic missiles annually from 2026

• Back production of 300-400 medium and long-range UAVs per month

• Strategic defense imperatives: European allies must prepare for potential direct confrontation with Russia by 2027-2030, the timeframe intelligence services identify for possible renewed Russian aggression. This requires reviewing NATO strategic plans for deploying at least 500,000 troops and developing genuine European strategic autonomy.

Economic warfare continuation: Maintaining G7+ sanctions coordination while strengthening measures against Russia’s shadow fleet becomes essential, as economic pressure remains one of the few tools forcing Russian strategic recalculation.

The report’s stark conclusion: half-measures risk the worst-case scenarios of either Ukrainian defeat or broader European conflict. The 75% probability assigned to continued military scenarios versus 25% for peace outcomes underscores that decisive military support now determines whether Europe faces prolonged instability or achieves sustainable security.

The Bundeswehr plans to invest more than 20 billion euros in the procurement of ammunition of various categories in the long term until 2037.

According to the current draft budget of Germany for 2025, 3.048 billion euros will be allocated for these purposes from the regular budget this year, as well as 1.657 billion euros from the Bundeswehr special fund, which will amount to a total of 4.705 billion euros.

By comparison, last year 3.075 billion euros were spent on ammunition from the special fund and 509 million euros from the regular budget.

Also included for the period from 2026 are funding commitments totalling 17.336 billion euros, which should provide ammunition manufacturers with a certain level of predictability and enable them to deploy the necessary capacities.

The largest one-off commitment of €2.93 billion is planned for 2028, followed by 2029 with €2.462 billion.

Additionally, the budget proposal does not specify what types of ammunition are being discussed and in what quantities they will be purchased, or whether these amounts include missiles for weapons systems such as the Arrow 3 or IRIS-T SLM.

@yigal_levin