Back at the start of the full scale invasion there were people saying all the maps showing areas of control, weren't portraying a true picture of Russian control because Ukraine is so vast, and what Russia really controlled was some roads and a few settlements, and no big cities. There were some maps trying to show the conflict in terms of road control in those early months.tabascoboy wrote: Wed Aug 30, 2023 4:55 pmYep those who know much more about it than I have pointed out the danger of weakness to counter-attacks and artillery on the flanks. Hopefully they are on it and opsec appliesUncle fester wrote: Wed Aug 30, 2023 4:26 pm Great they are adding depth to the breach. When do they plan on adding width?
This situation is different but also similar in how the map may not be telling the full story. Russia has built two "Surovikin lines", and in the area north of those lines up to the Ukrainian controlled area is loaded with minefields and Russian fighting positions (trenches/bunkers), any wooded area there is covered in Russian fortifications. To get vehicles through the two big defencive lines/"Surovikin lines" and the fortified area between them and the Ukrainian position (for resupply/reinforcements), means there's a limited amount of access points. It has to be this way because the point of the Russian minefields/tank traps/dragon's teeth/trenches/bunkers, is to funnel the Ukrainian attack into kill boxes.
The problem for Russia if Ukraine breaches all this, as it is doing, is it's very hard to maneuverer and attack Ukraine's flanks and turn the Ukrainian advance into a Ukrainian encircled pocket. The Russians have just spent half a year digging in to prevent that type of warfare. The important thing becomes controlling the roads/approaches.
Once Ukraine have punched a big hole in the first Surovikin line, Ukraine can roll it up to the highway connecting Robotyne and Tokmak, taking the Novoprokopivka/Solodka Balka area. If Russia cannot stop Ukraine's artillery controlling roads/approaches, it cannot counter the flanks and has to go head on into Ukraine's advance. The logical thing for Russia to do once Ukraine is through the the first Surovikin line would be to counter Ukraine head on to try and win back control of the first Surovikin line.
If that all works in Ukraine's favour they have a choice to press on down the highway towards Tokmak, or if they want to widen the breach swing west and use the Dnipro (like using the touchline as an extra defender in rugby), which would trap thousands of Russians if they don't pull out. It's probably one or the other, swing west and those Russians pull out into Tokmak making taking it harder.
I'm no general though, so that could all be bullshit. But I think I'm safe in saying the quantity and depth of fortifications and the quality of Ukraine's screening units are working to reduce the risk of Ukraine going narrow.
